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In Final Fantasy [the first film to have an entirely computer-generated female lead] 
not only were the mouths of the real actors filmed and digitised, so that the virtual 
characters’ lips could be synchronised with the sound, but every bit of walking, 
clambering and jumping was first done in a studio by stuntmen, so that the 
movements could be pasted wholesale on to digital skeletons…The directors have 
made people do all this, and then thrown the people away.  As such some viewers 
might be forgiven for considering Final Fantasy to be a giant con trick…the cast of 
Final Fantasy are merely the pixellated ghosts of human movement.  It is a 
melancholy species of shadow puppet theatre.  
(Steven Poole’s review of Final Fantasy: The Spirits Within, New Statesman, 6 




Ryle’s regress objection to the ‘Intellectualist Legend’ – that intelligent activity 
requires prior theoretical operations – was recognized by Fodor to present a powerful 
conceptual obstacle to the premise that underlies cognitivist approaches in the 
sciences.  He attempts to thwart Ryle’s argument in The Language of Thought by 
accusing him of confusing causal and conceptual explanations and claiming that, by 
analogy with computers, we can see how the appeal to explicit rules is halted at the 
first level since second-order rules are reducible to built-in causal processes. 
 
In this paper I argue that Fodor’s arguments against Ryle fail.  In the first section, I 
suggest that Fodor’s appeal to the ‘empirical necessity’ of theoretical operations 
misfires because he is the one who has misunderstood the difference between causal 
and conceptual questions.  In section two, I argue that the fact that second-order rules 
are reducible to causal processes shows, not that the regress is halted, but that we 
cannot consider intelligent activity by analogy with computers.  In section three, I 
discuss the philosophical motivation for introducing rules into an account of 




In The Concept of Mind, Ryle spells out a vicious regress that confronts the rationalist 
or ‘Intellectualist’:  performing some activity intelligently, rationally, or with reason 
cannot require prior theoretical operations such as deliberating, calculating, or 
 following rules since these are activities that are themselves performed intelligently, 
rationally, or with reason.  So it must be possible to act intelligently, rationally, or 
with reason without prior deliberation, calculation, or rule-following.  Otherwise one 
would need to suppose the existence of prior theoretical operations ad infinitum.   
 
In the introduction to The Language of Thought Fodor remarks that it is difficult to 
think of an area of cognitive psychology in which the array of arguments in The 
Concept of Mind would not apply or in which Ryle does not apply them.1   
 
Indeed, it is perhaps Ryle’s central point that ‘Cartesian’ (i.e., mentalistic) 
psychological theories treat what is really a logical relation between aspects of 
a single event as though it were a causal relation between pairs of distinct 
events.  It is this tendency to give mechanistic answers to conceptual questions 
which, according to Ryle, leads the mentalist to orgies of regrettable 
hypostasis: i.e., to attempting to explain behaviour by reference to underlying 
psychological mechanisms. (5) 
 
Fodor goes on to say:  
 
If this is a mistake, I’m in trouble.  For it will be the pervasive assumption of 
my discussion that such explanations, however often they may prove to be 
empirically unsound are, in principle, methodologically impeccable.  (5)   
 
Having said this, Fodor spends a few pages addressing Ryle’s arguments before 
developing his own particular version of the representational theory of mind: one that 
construes cognition as rule-governed computations over syntactically structured 
symbols or representations.2  I will be considering these arguments as we go along. 
 
Language-learning, perception, and rational choice are paradigmatic of abilities, 
according to Fodor, that admit of a cognitive/computational explanation.  Fodor’s 
argument for this begins with his presenting the following model as ‘an 
overwhelmingly plausible’ account of how at least some behaviour is decided upon.   
[a.] The agent finds himself in a certain situation (S).   
                                         
1 Fodor’s recent LOT 2 takes most of his earlier arguments for granted; it assumes that he has met 
Ryle’s challenge. Although he does revisit the ‘pragmatist’ criticism of the appeal to explicit rules, his 
arguments tend to reiterate, but do not much expand upon, the ones he addresses in more detail in the 
earlier work I am considering here. 
 
2 This discussion of Ryle follows a more extensive treatment in his earlier work Psychological 
Explanation.  See note 5, below. 
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 [b.] The agent believes that a certain set of behavioural options (B1, B2,… Bn) 
is available to him in S; i.e., given S, B1 through Bn are the things the agent 
believes that he can do. 
[c.] The probable consequence of performing each of B1 through Bn are 
predicted; i.e., the agent computes a set of hypotheticals of roughly the form if 
B1 is performed in S, then, with a certain probability, Ci.  Which such 
hypotheticals are computed and which probabilities are assigned will, of 
course, depend on what the organism (sic3) knows or believes about situations 
like S. (It will also depend upon other variables which are, from the point of 
view of the present model, merely noisy: time pressure, the amount of 
computation space available to the organism, etc.) 
[d.] A preference order is assigned to the consequences. 
[e.] The organism’s choice of behaviour is determined as a function of the 
preferences and the probability assigned. (28) 
 
In a footnote, Fodor admits that the model does not provide a ‘logically necessary’ 
condition for rational behaviour: 
…the conceptual story about what makes behaviour rational presumably 
requires a certain kind of correspondence between behaviour and belief but 
doesn’t care about the character of the processes whereby that correspondence 
is effected. (29)   
 
But a few sentences earlier in the text, conceding that the model is highly idealised, he 
argues that the most this concession shows is that ‘the behaviours we produce aren’t 
always in rational correspondence with the beliefs we hold.’  Here he does seem to 
suggest that the deliberation model he describes provides a necessary condition for 
bringing about a rational correspondence between beliefs and action—at least for 
human beings: when the model is not adhered to, the behaviour is not rational.  For he 
goes on to suggest that though angels may be rational by reflex, the model, ‘or 
something like it’, may be ‘empirically necessary’ for bringing about a rational 
correspondence between the beliefs and the behaviours of human and other 
‘sublunary’ creatures.  
..some agents are rational to some extent some of the time, and …when they 
are, and to the extent that they are, processes [like these] mediate the relation 
between what the agent believes and what he does. (29) 
 
What started out as an intuitively plausible model of how at least some behaviour is 
decided upon has turned into a theory about what is necessary for rational action in 
                                         
3 Note that agents are the possessors of the abilities to begin with and then, without argument or 
remark, the abilities are attributed to organisms. 
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 human beings.   What occurs in some passages as an empirical hypothesis about 
underlying mechanisms occurs in others as a covert conceptual claim: it suggests what 
we correctly count as rational action in human beings.  Fodor can no longer appeal to 
intuitions for this claim, whatever its status, so where is the argument?  If the overt 
conceptual story, as he concedes, merely requires a correspondence between attitudes 
and behaviour and is silent about any processes involved, then angels may indeed be 
rational without deliberating, but so may human beings.  Curiously, Fodor also admits 
(in the same footnote) that the production of behaviour that follows the deliberation 
model is not sufficient for the rationality of the behaviour, since the beliefs involved 
may be superstitious or the preferences perverse, or the computation grossly unsound.   
  
Here we hit upon the matter that bothered Ryle in his arguments against the 
Intellectualist (and, indeed, Wittgenstein in his discussion of rules).   When we 
consider the (relatively rare) circumstances in which we do deliberate as the model 
suggests, a multitude of things can go wrong.   In predicting the probable 
consequences of a range of behaviours, assigning a preference order to them, 
determining his choice as a function of the preferences and the probability assigned, 
the agent is, we assume, acting rationally.  Since the ability to deliberate about one’s 
options is itself a higher-order rational ability, this higher-order ability cannot be 
required for rationality.  It cannot be considered necessary because the alleged 
explanation (the higher-order ability) presupposes the very thing (rational action) it is 
supposed to explain.  It is not that it is merely insufficient and that something else is 
needed:  it is insufficient because the explanandum is presupposed in the explanans.  
That is why it cannot be considered necessary either.  That is the gist of Ryle’s infinite 
regress objection to the Intellectualist Legend. 
 
Let us look again at Fodor’s claim.  If it is conceded that an agent need not deliberate 
as the model suggests in order for his performance to count as rational (which, for 
argument’s sake, let us accept, lines up with his beliefs) then what does it mean to say 
that it is empirically necessary?  What could it mean to say that human agents must 
deliberate as the model suggests when it is conceded that even if they were to, doing 
so is neither necessary nor sufficient for what we would justifiably count as rational 
action?  In order to clarify this, Fodor refers us back to his earlier treatment of the 
difference between the kind of conceptual story that typically interests analytic 
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 philosophers and the type of causal story that interests psychologists.  The suggestion 
is that Ryle, in his impatience with those who attempt to offer causal answers to 
conceptual questions, is guilty of confusing conceptual with empirical claims, for the 
fact that there can be a conceptual answer to the question what makes [an] x [an] F 
does not rule out the possibility of a causal story as well.   
In general, suppose that C is a conceptually sufficient condition for having the 
property P, and suppose that some individual a does, in brute fact, satisfy C, 
so that ‘Pa’ is a contingent statement true of a.  Then: (a) it is normally 
pertinent to ask for a causal /mechanistic explanation of the fact that ‘Pa’ is 
true; (b) such an explanation will normally constitute a (candidate) answer to 
the question: ‘What makes a exhibit the property P?’; (c) referring to the fact 
that a satisfies C will normally not constitute a causal/mechanistic explanation 
of the fact that a exhibits the property P, although, (d) reference to the fact that 
a satisfies C may constitute a certain (different) kind of answer to ‘What 
makes ‘Pa’ true?’…(8)  
 
To put this point as generally as I know how, even if the behaviourists were 
right in supposing that logically necessary and sufficient conditions for 
behaviour being of a certain kind can be given (just) in terms of stimulus and 
response variables, that fact would not in the least prejudice the mentalist’s 
claim that the causation of behaviour is determined by, and explicable in terms 
of, the organism’s internal states. (8) 
   
Of course it is true that conceptual claims involving causal concepts may invite the 
search for underlying mechanisms.  If the concept of a heart is the concept of that 
which pumps blood throughout the organism, a search for that which functions as the 
pump in different creatures would be in order; the concept of poison invites an 
investigation as to whether a particular chemical, for example, causes illness or death; 
and the concept of disease allows, and then may change it contours to accommodate 
the results of, a search for viruses or bacteria responsible for its symptoms.   
 
Suppose Fodor is right that the concept of rationality requires agents’ beliefs and 
actions to line up in rational correspondence.  An explanation of this could be as 
follows:  We ascribe beliefs, etc. as part of the enterprise of making sense of an agent 
and we do this by attributing to him beliefs and other attitudes that line up with his 
actions, as described.  Such is the goal of the enterprise; that is why actions and 
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 beliefs (etc.) tend to line up.4  So far there is nothing to suggest that a causal story 
explaining the rational line-up is to be found inside the individual or his brain.   
 
In order to underline the point, consider Fodor’s own discussion of the conceptual and 
causal explanations that may both be given for General Mill’s claim that ‘Wheaties is 
the breakfast of champions’.  The conceptual explanation is that a non-negligible 
number of champions eat the wheat-flake cereal; a causal story perfectly consistent 
with this, Fodor suggests, may advert to the vitamins and special springiness of the 
flake’s molecules.   
 
The problem with this analogy is that the underlying causal story is only consistent 
with the conceptual one if the ‘because’ in ‘because a non-negligible number of 
champions eat it’ is a causal one.  One of the main aims of Ryle’s work is to suggest 
that mental expressions, among a large number of others, discharge their explanatory 
role other than by attributing a property (a fortiori a property with causal powers) to 
an object.  Thus, as with the cases for which the Wheaties example is intended to be a 
model, here too, we have been given no reason for looking inside the composition of 
the cereal in our search for a mechanism that underlies the conceptual claim.  For a 
non-negligible number of champions may eat Wheaties because they have been paid a 
lot of money to endorse the product; or because the champions they most admire do; 
or because they are given the breakfast free during sporting events, and so forth and 
so on.  In these cases, even if the molecules in Wheaties flakes are especially springy, 
this will be completely irrelevant to an explanation why a large number of champions 
eat them. 
 
It may be instructive to take a quick look at other powers – ‘thick’ powers we might 
say – that may be found on a high rung of what Ryle calls ‘the ladder of 
sophistication’ in order to see how silly it would be to search for so-called ‘natural’ 
properties or relations to explain them.  A penny has a certain purchasing power; a 
football has score-enabling power; and a bishop in chess has the power to move 
diagonally across the board.  If an anthropologist from Mars were to wonder what 
                                         
4 Compare: the explanation why so many games of chess end up in check-mate is that such is the goal 
of the game. 
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 explains these respective powers he would be making a mistake to take the penny, 
football, or bishop back to his laboratory to search for their physical realizations.  But 
this is obviously not to suggest that the respective powers are supernatural: he is just 
looking in the wrong place for the explanation he seeks.  Nor is this to deny that the 
penny, the football, or the bishop have interesting physical properties, perhaps even 
properties that enable them to perform the roles they do.  If a penny were not a certain 
size and weight it could not be used in transactions for gum balls; if the football were 
not shaped exactly so, a Beckham could not bend it and if a chess piece were made of 
ice it would not survive competition on a very hot day.  Nor is this to deny that the 
penny is ripe for a mineralogical examination, a historical-numismatic examination, 
an investigation for fingerprints, for counterfeiting, and so on indefinitely.  But none 
of these investigations are going to shed much light on its purchasing power.  A credit 
card would be a more suitable candidate, for its magnetic strip and chip encode 
information that plays an even more complex role in the sort of economic transactions 
in which it trades.  But however complex the credit card, we will not find an answer to 
how it gets its purchasing power without adverting to the banking institutions and 
economic environment in which it plays its role.  The human brain is, by all accounts, 
the most complex and wonderful object in the world.  But so far we are left with no 
reason to suppose that an answer to the question about why our beliefs line up with 
our actions is one that can be given by looking at second-order properties that 
supervene on matter that is to be found inside the agent’s skull.   
 
Like the alien anthropologist who takes the penny home to examine it, the cognitive 
psychologist may well be looking in the wrong place for an explanation of the agent’s 
rational powers.  To insist that the purposive elements of the mental phenomena under 
examination – and thus the normative dimension along which they can be assessed – 
may be partly explained by special content-bearing states supervenient upon the brain 
is as misguided as insisting that the normative dimension upon which a game of 
football can be assessed may be partly explained by special score-enabling properties 
(which, in a ‘long-arm’ version, reach out into the world) that somehow emerge from 
the molecules of the football. 
 
I suggest there is no reason to believe that deliberation—or something like it—is 
necessary for rational action in human beings.  Although we deliberate as the model 
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 suggests some of the time Ryle’s argument shows that the supposition that we must 
do so leads to a vicious regress.  To anticipate what is to come: to show that a 
hypothesized mechanism which is alleged to play the role of, or go proxy for, 
deliberation does not lead to regress fails to meet the point of Ryle’s objection, which 
is that deliberation of the kind suggested by the model is not, because it cannot, be 
conceptually required for rational action.  It seems that Fodor, and not Ryle, is guilty 
of confusing conceptual with empirical claims.5 
 
II.   
 
The cognitive-psychological models Fodor describes (that of deliberation, perception, 
and hypothesis-testing for language-learning) presuppose that the agent has access to 
a representational system of considerable richness.  This system, he argues, must 
share a number of characteristic features of real languages and it requires an 
ontological commitment to the processes and states ascribed by that model.   
…[D]eciding is a computational process; the act the agent performs is the 
consequence of computations defined over representations of possible actions.  
No representations, no computations.  No computations, no model.  (31) 
 
When he considers our understanding of the language of representations over which 
the alleged computations are performed Fodor addresses the threat of regress.   For if 
                                         
5 There are various confusions and conflations in Fodor’s discussion of Ryle both in The Language of 
Thought and in his earlier Psychological Explanation.  Part of the difficulty is that though Fodor 
(rightly) identifies Ryle as working in a Wittgensteinian spirit, he also (wrongly) identifies Ryle’s 
programme with that of the logical behaviourist; i.e., one, who, according to Fodor, hopes to show that 
‘logically necessary and sufficient conditions for behaviour being of a certain kind can be given in 
terms of stimulus and response variables’ (8).  (Indeed, in this quotation, psychological behaviourism 
and logical behaviourism are conflated.)  He also (wrongly) suggests that the appeal to criteria implies 
a ‘criteriological’ theory of meaning which he construes as a type of (property) cluster theory (5, fn). 
 
Sometimes when philosophers invoke the distinction between logical, conceptual, metaphysical, and 
physical possibility or impossibility, they take the conceptual story to involve what we can consistently 
imagine to be the case in logically possible worlds that may be at a distance from ours, vis à vis the (or 
our) laws of nature.  On this view, the use of predicates in the relevant domain of discourse tends to 
drop out of the picture.   Ryle’s conceptual cartography, by contrast, traces the inflections of meaning, 
or elasticities of significance of the term ‘rational’ and its cognates.  By his lights it would not make 
sense to say that a philosopher could explore a concept (such as rationality) and ignore the way the 
relevant predicates are used.  So another mistake Fodor makes in discussing Ryle involves mixing up 
Ryle’s project in conceptual cartography in which concepts are construed as double abstractions from 
sentences performing their various jobs with those philosophers (Frege, early Russell and Moore) who 
suppose concepts to be, in the Platonic tradition, independently existing ideals (whose ‘essences’ can 
be unpacked by necessary and sufficient conditions for the concepts’ application) to which our natural 
(imperfect) expressions merely gesture.  Ryle’s criticism of this approach began with his first articles 
and continued for the rest of his career. 
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 understanding a predicate of English requires representing the extension of that 
predicate in a language that one already understands, then what about the predicates 
of the meta-language?  If understanding an English predicate requires representing its 
extension in a language then understanding the predicate of a meta-language 
presumably requires representing its extension in some meta-meta-language, ad 
infinitum.   
 
Here, Fodor allows that what we may count as ‘understanding the predicate of a meta-
language’ may not require representing its extension:  ‘a sufficient condition [for this] 
might be just that one’s use of the predicate is always in fact conformable to the truth 
rule’ (65).  To put this in Rylean terms (in a way Fodor does not) it seems that he is 
here allowing that understanding a predicate in a meta-language may be a matter of 
knowing this language by wont; that is, without the need to involve prior theoretical 
operations.  But the obvious question, which Fodor acknowledges, is why he will not 
allow that learning English is a skill that is acquired through training and practice; a 
kind of knowledge-how or knowledge-by-wont that underlies any explicit higher-
order practice of following a meaning-rule.  
 
Fodor fails, after a long discussion, to meet this objection.  He compares the language 
of thought (Mentalese) and a natural language such as English with the two languages 
used by computers: the input/output (programming) language and a machine language 
which the machine is built to use.   
Roughly, the machine language differs from the input/output language in that 
its formulae correspond directly to computationally relevant physical states 
and operations of the machine:  The physics of the machine thus guarantees 
that the sequences of states and operations it runs through in the course of its 
computations respect the semantic constraints on formulae in its internal 
language.  What takes the place of a truth definition for the machine language 
is simply the engineering principles which guarantee this correspondence.  
(66) 
 
Although this kind of correspondence may also hold between physical states of the 
machine and formulae of the input/output code, this could be effected only by first 
translating them into the machine language.   It is in this sense that the machine 
‘follows’ the input/output code but only acts in accordance with its machine language.  
The idea seems to be that while genuine rule-following occurs in the programming 
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 language, mere rule-conformity occurs in the machine language.  (I shall be 
challenging this idea in the following section.) 
 
This thought is developed further in a footnote in which Fodor considers what is 
involved in thinking of an organism as a computer.  It is wrong-headed, he contends, 
to think of the nervous system as issuing commands which must be ‘read’ and 
translated into action or behaviour by a further system that intervenes between the 
efferent nerves and the effectors.   
On the contrary, what is required is just that the causal properties of such 
physical events as are interpreted as messages in the internal code must be 
compatible with the linguistic properties that the interpretation assigns to those 
events.  Thus, if events of the physical type P are to be interpreted as 
commands to effector system E, then it better be the case that, ceteris paribus, 
occurrences of P-events are causally sufficient for activating E.  (Ceteris 
paribus means: barring mechanical breakdown and barring events 
interpretable as overriding countercommands to E.) (74) 
 
In the following footnote, Fodor responds to the critic who suggests that if one is 
willing to attribute regularities in the behaviour of organisms to rules that they 
unconsciously follow, one may as well attribute, say, Kepler’s laws to planets in 
pursuit of their orbits.  The point of the critic’s remark, Fodor says, is to suggest ‘that 
the only real case of rule following is conscious rule following by articulate 
organisms’ (74).  Other organisms merely act in accordance with rules; they do not 
follow them.   
 
Fodor replies to this imagined critic that what distinguishes unconscious rule 
following from the rule conformity exhibited by planets is that ‘a representation of the 
rules [organisms] follow constitutes one of the causal determinants of their 
behaviour’ (74).  Such is not the case for planets: ‘At no point in a causal account of 
their turning does one advert to a structure which encodes Kepler’s laws and causes 
them to turn’ (74).   
 
This is an ill-considered criticism of the position, which I shall have something to say 
about in the next section.  In any case, Fodor’s tactic is clear: if rules can be seen to be 
encoded or represented in the structure of the system and constitute one of the causal 
determinants of behaviour, the organism (or its subsystems) can be said to be 
following them.  Indeed, this move is a now familiar one in cognitive psychology and 
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 computer design for both are faced with what is known as the homunculus problem, 
which, it is generally accepted, can be avoided.  Indeed, some understand this threat to 
be an articulation of Ryle’s regress argument, so it will be worth a short digression to 
examine this problem in a bit more detail. 6 
 
The cognitive scientist, whose job is to explain some particular complex form of 
cognitive behaviour, will attempt to construe the behaviour as an information-
processing task.   The classical cognitive scientist will construe this, following Turing, 
as involving rule-governed computations over syntactically structured symbols.  In 
order to say how the information-processing task is accomplished in the system in 
question, the cognitive psychologist uses a method called forward engineering or 
functional analysis.  The aim of the analysis at this mid-level is to uncover the 
particular algorithm that is assumed to be ‘used’ by the system to complete the 
information-processing task that was defined by the higher-order computational 
analysis.   In other words, since it is assumed that some effective procedure or other is 
implemented by the system to tackle the information-processing task identified at the 
computational level of analysis, the goal of forward engineering or functional analysis 
is to identify that procedure.   Whereas the programmer or designer of some device 
will amass rules, heuristics, and brute procedures for producing the correct responses 
for some task, a (classical) cognitive scientist will assume that his subject is using 
some combination of such procedures and attempt to determine which ones, or 
‘recreate the program that is producing the behaviour’ (Dawson, 109).   This is the 
goal of functional analysis.   
 
But if the goal is to analyse or divide complex functions into sub-functions, the danger 
is that they will never end.   
It would appear that functional analysis leads us directly into Ryle’s Regress; 
each function that we propose to explain an earlier black box will rear its head 
as an ugly homunculus.  We wind up with an infinite proliferation of 
unexplained functional terms.  (Dawson, 156) 
 
Forward engineering must be constrained so that each functional decomposition is 
decomposable into simpler functions.  There has to be some principled reasons for 
supposing that functional decomposition must stop.  And finally, it must be clear how 
                                         
6 The discussion below in the text follows Dawson. 
 11
 the set of functions that exist at the end of forward engineering can be physically 
implemented.   ‘It is only with this third claim that a classical cognitive scientist can 
abolish the ghost from the machine.’  (Dawson, 157) 
 
Although Dennett expresses doubt about various aspects of Fodor’s project, he 
explicitly praises this way of avoiding the homunculus problem in his review of The 
Language of Thought. 
…perhaps the prima facie absurd notion of self-understanding representations 
is an idea whose time has come, for what are the ‘data structures’ of computer 
science if not just that: representations that understand themselves?  In a 
computer, a command to dig goes straight to the shovel, as it were, eliminating 
the comprehending and obeying middleman.  Not straight to the shovel, of 
course, for a lot of sophisticated switching machinery is required to get the 
right command going to the right tools, and for some purposes it is 
illuminating to treat parts of this switching machinery as analogous to 
displaced shovellers, subcontractors and contractors.   The beauty of it all, and 
its importance for psychology, is precisely that it promises to solve Hume’s 
problem by giving us a model of vehicles of representation that function 
without exempt agents for whom they are ploys.  Alternatively, one could 
insist that the very lack of exempt agents in computers to be the users of the 
putative representations shows that computers do not contain 
representations—real representations—at all, but unless one views this as a 
rather modest bit of lexicographical purism, one is in danger of discarding one 
of the most promising conceptual advances ever to fall into philosophers’ 
hands. (102) 
 
I shall be arguing that the suggestion that computers do not contain real 
representations is not a modest bit of lexicographical purism: indeed, the ontological 
status of Fodor’s hypothesized language of thought is at stake (as is, incidentally, the 
realism of the Representational Theory of Mind, as well as that of the content-bearing 
mental states that are alleged to play a causal/explanatory role in functionalist 
philosophies of mind).  Here, let us note that it is not at all clear how the digression on 
machine code language helps Fodor’s argument.  Fodor turned to computers when 
asked why we could not say ‘we’re just built that way’ one level earlier — to explain 
how we learn the English predicate ‘is a chair’— thus making the retreat from the 
natural language to the inner language unnecessary.  After introducing the difference 
between programming language and machine code, Fodor returns to this question and 
replies that he agrees (presumably with Wittgenstein) that explanation has to stop 
somewhere, ‘but it doesn’t have to —and better not— stop here.’ 
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 The question of how we learn ‘is a chair’ does arise precisely because English 
is learned.  The question of how [a predicate of the meta-language] is learned 
does not arise precisely because, by hypothesis, the language in which [the 
predicate] is a formula is innate. (67)  
 
This response simply begs the question; it assumes but offers no support for the claim 
that we need to posit a meta-language to explain how English is learned.  The model 
can only be considered a ‘hypothesis to the best explanation’ if we have some reason 
to believe that an explanation of the kind proposed is required.   
The same criticism can be raised against Fodor’s language-learning hypothesis.  
Presumably Fodor would agree that the conceptual story for (what we correctly count 
as) learning a (first, natural) language does not require explicit hypothesis-testing.  If 
we do on occasion test a hypothesis for the application of a predicate it is either 
without using language to do so or, if we do use language, a fair bit must have already 
been learned.  After all, the same regress arguments can be marshalled to show that 
hypothesis-testing is not sufficient, because of the possibility of error.   And, of 
course, the (natural) language in which explicit hypothesis-testing would be couched 
presupposes the very thing the hypothesis-testing is supposed to explain.  So it cannot 
be necessary either.  Thus there is no motivation for supposing the existence of an 
underlying mechanism that subserves the role of explicit hypothesis-testing, for it is 
has just been conceded that hypothesis-testing is neither necessary nor sufficient.  
Thus the suggestion that there is a non-explicit, innate, error-free, hypothesis-testing 
mechanism that does not threaten regress is completely unmotivated.  In other words, 
to argue as Dennett does that the regress is not vicious (because the homunculi 
become ‘stupider’ and ‘stupider’ until they finally drop out of the picture) would at 
most block the argument from absurdity and allow that prior—mechanical—
operations are not ruled out.  But this would still yield no support at all for the covert 
conceptual claim that such mechanical operations are necessary to explain the ability 
of human beings to act rationally or understand language.  
 
Fodor’s response to the objection that the retreat from natural language to Mentalese 
is not necessary simply begs the question against those who think that learning 
English may involve training, practice, and the (innate, if you wish) capacity to catch 
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 on to similarities that are natural in the circumstances.7  Nothing in the fact that 
English is learned requires that this learning must be effected via mechanised 
hypothesis-formation which in turn would require a meta-language.     
 
. . . . . .  
 
I have argued that the point of Ryle’s regress argument against the rationalist or 
Intellectualist was to show that prior theoretical operations cannot be considered 
necessary for rational action, language learning, or intelligent abilities in general, for 
the supposition leads to absurdity.  The conclusion is that it must be possible to act 
rationally, understand a language, or act intelligently without participating in what are 
in effect higher-order activities requiring the same abilities. 
 
Fodor seems to agree that prior theoretical operations are not conceptually required, 
but maintains they are ‘empirically necessary’ for human beings.  But this is confused.  
If such higher-order activities were conceptually required, it would make sense to 
look for mechanisms that subserve these operations in human beings.  But they are 
not, so it does not.  Fodor thus seems to be making the covert conceptual claim that 
such operations are necessary; not for angels, but for human beings and other 
‘sublunary’ creatures.  But we have been given no reason for believing this claim, 
other than that it would make theoretical sense of work in the cognitive sciences.  On 
the contrary, if the operations are, as Ryle envisaged, higher-order rational activities, 
then they are ones that assume the ability to be explained, and we have been given an 
overwhelming reason for rejecting it. 
 
                                         
7 Georges Rey (1997; 5) gives similar short shrift to the objection by parodying the attitude—
crystallized in Wittgenstein’s (1953, §1) comment that explanations have to come to an end 
somewhere:   
[O]ne could… [rationally]… never ask for explanations of anything at all: we could just say 
that it is a natural capacity of lightning to burn what it strikes.  The question is whether we can 
also rationally ask for slightly deeper explanations, and, if we can, what those explanations 
might be. 
 
But this also is too quick, since Wittgenstein’s discussion of rules, like Ryle’s battle with the 
Intellectualist, constitutes a sustained argument for the limits of rule-following explanations or those 
requiring prior theoretical operations. 
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 In assimilating Ryle’s regress with the homunculus problem in cognitive science and 
computer design, Fodor attempts to maintain that the regress is not a threat because it 
is not vicious.  I have argued in response, that even if this assimilation were in order, 
it could at most block the argument from absurdity by retreating to some other kind of 
operation; one that is not a higher-order intellectual activity.  But we have no 
argument that such an operation is necessary.  Indeed, with this move to a different 
kind of (because now mechanised) operation, would are bereft of the original 
‘overwhelmingly plausible’ account of how some behaviour is decided upon or, 
generalising to cover the case of hypothesis-testing, how some languages are learned, 
since that model has been replaced by one with very little indeed in common, as we 
shall see.  The result is that we are left with no positive reason for believing that 
mechanised ‘deliberation’ or ‘hypothesis-testing’ is necessary for rational action and 
language-learning in any creature.       
 
To be sure, some stretch of activity may be photographically or telephonically 
indistinguishable from that which is assessable as intelligent, rational, meaningful, 
etc.  We still need a way of distinguishing these cases, and for this we need to appeal 
to norms, or the criteria upon which such activity may be assessed.8  But Ryle is right 
that acting intelligently, etc. does not require that the agent casts a sideways glance at 
rules that embody these criteria.  I have argued above that the supposition that these 
rules are hardwired is unmotivated; below I shall argue that mechanising the rules 




Why would anyone think that prior deliberation—or something like it— is necessary 
for rational action?  What motivates the rationalist, for example, to think that 
intelligence in general requires prior theoretical operations?   
                                         
8 The intentions and propositional attitudes of the agent are indeed relevant in distinguishing these 
situations.  But to attribute an intention is not a matter of naming a particular kind of mental state, 
roughly in the brain, that takes propositional content as its object.  It is to deploy a linguistic tool – 
several steps up the ‘discourse’ ladder of sophistication – that puts a marker down on just those 
assessment conditions that are relevant. See my (in progress, 2005, 2008, and 2009) for more on the 
explanatory function and logic of intention and other propositional attitude attributions. 
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The rationalist, or Intellectualist, might argue as follows: what distinguishes one 
bodily movement from another imperceptibly different movement (in one sense of 
‘imperceptible’) is the fact that one is intentional, the result of agency, the result of 
reasons; the other not.  On the rationalist construal, this difference amounts to the 
occurrence of a non-perceptual, mental feature (an ‘intention’, ‘deliberation’, 
‘reason’) that plays a causal role issuing in behaviour.  Similarly, what distinguishes 
the meaningfulness of a person’s utterance from a phonetically similar sound made 
by, say, a parrot is the addition, in the first case, of a mental act of ‘meaning’.  What 
distinguishes acts of hearing from acts of listening is the mental accompaniment of 
‘understanding’.  What distinguishes an inference from a mere string of statements is 
that the first was, but the second was not, made ‘under the influence’ of the rules of 
logic.   
 
According to Ryle, this construal of what is required for rational action, language 
understanding, or intelligence may have derived from Plato’s doctrine of the tripartite 
soul in which Intelligence is a special faculty by which internal acts of thinking—
particularly the consideration of regulative propositions— are exercised.  This 
construal of what is required seemed to be encouraged by the Enlightenment idea that 
mathematics and natural science set the standard as human accomplishments.  
Impressed by the analogy, the rationalist supposed that it was the capacity for 
theorizing that constitutes the intellectual excellence of man, together with      
the idea that the capacity to attain knowledge of truths was the defining 
property of a mind.  Other human powers could be classed as mental only if 
they could be shown to be somehow piloted by the intellectual grasp of true 
propositions.  To be rational was to be able to recognize truths and the 
connexions between them.  To act rationally was, therefore, to have one’s non-
theoretical propensities controlled by one’s apprehension of truths about the 
conduct of life. (15) 
   
But, as we have seen, since theorizing is itself an intellectual ability it cannot be 
required for intelligence, on pain of regress.  What of the suggestion that grasp of 
truth or of regulative propositions controls one’s non-theoretical propensities in a 
merely mechanical way?  This would at least seem to eliminate the threat of regress.  
The trouble with this suggestion is that two different kinds of explanation are 
conflated.  The first, an explanation by appeal to standards or norms that are codified 
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 in the performance-rules that govern some activity or practice; the second, an 
explanation by appeal to causal relations or to the laws of nature which are supposed 
to subsume them.   
 
Rules have different explanatory functions from those of natural laws.  The rules that 
govern rational action or logical inference, for example, help us to identify what is 
incorrect in certain performances and correct in others.  Such explanations work by 
showing how the performance attains or fails to attain the standards or norms set for 
the practice.  These are explanations relatively high up Ryle’s ‘sophistication ladder’.  
They are descriptions of the referee, theorist, or tactician. 
 
If someone (as I once did, when very young) puts a cup of milk into a mixture for 
oatmeal cookies, and wonders why the consistency is wrong, pointing to the recipe 
that says ‘add 1T milk’ is one way of diagnosing the problem.  If someone who cooks 
by intuition tosses into a mixture of sugar, butter, oatmeal, etc. a small amount of 
milk, and the cookies are good, then measuring the amount and writing it down as part 
of a recipe could be part of a useful second-order practice for those who want to cook 
but do not have the natural talent.  Similarly, if someone is confused by a complicated 
argument, showing that the argument, once symbolized, is not valid would be one 
way of showing what is wrong with it.  Indeed, explaining that it conforms to an 
accepted rule of inference is a way of showing that it is correct.  But as Ryle says, the 
rules of logic, like the rules of etiquette or the rules of cooking are performance rules: 
‘only performances can be or fail to be in accordance with them’ (Ryle 1946/2009, 
241).    
 
This, incidentally, is why the appeal to Kepler’s laws mentioned earlier was inapt.  
The point of the critic’s remark, recall, was to suggest that the only real case of rule 
following is conscious rule following by articulate organisms: other organisms merely 
act in accordance with rules; they do not follow them.  Fodor replied that what 
distinguishes unconscious rule following from the rule conformity exhibited by 
planets is that ‘a representation of the rules [organisms] follow constitutes one of the 
causal determinants of their behaviour’(74).  Such is not the case for planets: ‘At no 
point in a causal account of their turning does one advert to a structure which encodes 
Kepler’s laws and causes them to turn’ (74).   But laws and performance rules are 
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 being conflated here.  Kepler’s laws are not performance rules; it makes no sense to 
talk about them being followed even by a person who is perfectly capable of 
representing them, let alone a planet that is not.  
 
Performance rules, do not, as Ryle reminds us, debar mistakes from happening.  In 
this way they are different from laws of nature or those events which are supposed to 
be causally determined, which       
rule out certain imaginable conjunctions of happenings or states of affairs in 
quite a different way.  Hence while there can and do occur breaches of logical 
rules, there cannot and do not occur breaches of laws of nature.  It makes sense 
to speak of someone obeying or disobeying a performance-rule, none to speak 
of things disobeying or obeying laws of nature. (1946/2009, 239)  
 
The rules that govern normative practices are performance rules.  I suggest that these 
rules be construed as encoding norms which allow an observer to pinpoint whether a 
particular performance has lived up to a set standard, whether or not the one credited 
with the ability to participate in the practice casts a sideways glance at these rules.  
This, I claim, is the upshot of the regress argument: it is possible to credit someone 
with an ability to participate in a practice even if he is not guided by performance 
rules.  It has to be so: consulting performance rules does not guarantee success or that 
the performance will live up to the standards which the rules attempt to codify.  The 
second-order practice guarantees nothing because each of the constituent, subordinate 
actions involved in following a rule, let alone in representing it, can go awry. The 
rules represented in a logic book, for example, may have been misprinted or mistaken; 
they may be misread, misinterpreted as applying to a certain situation and not another; 
once consulted they may be ignored, or may not anticipate novel circumstances, and 
so forth and so on.   
 
Fodor’s imagined critic was half right to say that it only makes sense to attribute the 
ability to follow a performance rule to conscious, articulate organisms, but the 
‘organism’ had better be a full-fledged rational agent since following a performance 
rule (as opposed merely to acting in accordance with it) involves its own series of 
rational actions.  And though we may describe someone as following a performance 
rule if he tells or shows us that he is, telling and showing are yet other (third-order) 
actions higher up on the sophistication ladder from following the rule, so it cannot be 
required for it. 
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Fodor’s argument began by giving a model of explicit deliberation that he suggested 
was a plausible account of how at least some behaviour is decided upon.  But this 
model, which involves a host of constituent, subordinate actions exploits principles, 
which, like many of the performance rules with which we are familiar, have come 
about in the first place because theorists crystallise them from  practices (most of 
which are constantly evolving) already up and running.  Just as a recipe writer will 
make decisions (with a particular audience in mind) about what moves in a chef’s 
performance are important for the production of a dish so will a mapmaker take a look 
at what the villagers do automatically in order to provide information of a different 
kind to one who does not know his way about.   
 
On this way of looking at things, the practice comes first; the codification of the 
practice comes later.  As Ryle reminds us,  
There were reasoners before Aristotle and strategists before Clausewitz.  The 
application of rules of reasoning and strategy did not have to await the work of 
their codifiers.  Aristotle and Clausewitz were, in fact, only able to extract 
these rules, because they were already being applied.  The crystallisation of 
performance-rules in rule-formulae is, in some cases, not the condition of their 
being applied [i.e., not necessary in order for something to be an observance of 
them] but a product of studies in the methodology of the practices in which 
they have already been applied. (1946/2009, 243)   
 
This is why Ryle suggests that when performance rules are applied (as opposed to 
followed) this is because of the intelligence of the theorists—that is, it is due to the 
good judgment of the logician, recipe-writer, or mapmaker who has distilled the rules 
(with his particular audience in mind, as well as his particular purposes for distilling 
them) from those performances that are deemed successful. 9    
 
How would we decide if someone is following a performance rule as opposed merely 
to acting in accord with it?10  Among the features we would point to in justifying our 
                                         
9 For more discussion see Tanney 2005/2009 and 2008. 
 
10 In this discussion I am, in effect, suggesting that ‘following a rule’ should be reserved for actions that 
involve the second-order activity of consulting a performance rule.  On this way of speaking, the fact 
that one acts in conformity with the norms, or acts in accordance with a performance rule, will 
sometimes suffice for deeming his action intelligent, etc. and sometimes not, i.e., when the action 
comes about by accident, for example.  I have not discussed the relevant considerations here (but see 
note 8, above).  Others (notably Wittgenstein and Ryle) seem to allow two senses of ‘following a rule’ 
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 description of someone as performing the second-order task of following a 
performance rule would be the existence of some representation or expression of that 
rule.  Other features we would expect to find would be the subordinate actions in 
which following a rule consists: for example, consultation of the rule-representation, 
and the application of it to the appropriate situation in action.  And if a rule can be 
consulted it can be misread or misunderstood.  If it can be applied it can be 
misapplied.  The existent of these constituent, subordinate actions, and the possibility 
of error that they entail, completely disappear from the mechanised model; and yet 
genuine rule-following, and not mere rule-conformity is supposed to be essential to 
the model.  
 
This discussion of performance rules gets, I think, at the heart of the normativity 
objection against ‘naturalistic’ theories.   The kind of explanation in which we trade 
when we advert to norms —those that govern the practices for which we are assessing 
their ability to participate— is inextricably tied up with the idea that performances 
may fall short of the norm as well as conform to it.  The normativity of these practices 
and the possibility of error are two sides of the same coin.   
 
Indeed, if the goal of computer design is to build a machine that conforms to the 
norms that govern some practice, why would we need to build it to consult 
performance rules—ones in accordance with which it is guaranteed (barring 
mechanical failure) to act?  Why not merely build it to conform to the norms encoded 
in these rules?  And why should Nature design our brains to consult performance rules 
– ones in accordance with which she guarantees, barring mechanical failure, we will 
act?  Why not merely build our brains to cotton on and eventually to conform 
whatever will turn out to be the relevant norms?   
 
The computationalist is committed not only to representations (‘tokens’ of beliefs, 
etc.) over which computations are performed; she is also committed to the 
representation of the rules that govern these computations.  If we construe the 
organism as a Universal Turing Machine, then the mental representations over which 
                                                                                                                   
or ‘applying criteria’ so that one may be following a rule or applying criteria in the sense that they are 
performing intelligently, etc., without following a rule or applying criteria in the sense of casting a 
sideways glance at a representation of that rule or codification of that criteria.    
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 computations are performed correspond to the ‘data’ symbols on the tape; the 
representation of the rules that govern these computations correspond to the machine 
table of the particular Turing Machine that the Universal Turing Machine is 
mimicking; or, in short, the particular programme computing the particular data.  In 
order to block the suggestion that if the rules themselves are represented there must be 
further rules explaining how to interpret them, the suggestion is that the 
implementation of the rules that govern the computations are built into the machine 
code (they correspond to the Universal Turing Machine’s machine table which is built 
into the head or scanner).   Computationalists are obliged to mechanise the rules 
governing the higher-order ability (i.e., they are obliged to maintain that the rules that 
govern deliberation and hypothesis-testing are built in) to avoid the explanatory 
regress.  But they insist that rule-representations are being genuinely followed, and 
not merely instantiated: this is required by the thesis that human beings are Turing 
Machines and are not mere instantiations of them.   But once the rules are 
‘mechanised’ — or viewed as causal determinates of the behaviour they are alleged to 
explain — their role as codifications of norms and the tools that are used to guide the 
first-order performance evaporates.11  This, indeed, is explicit in Fodor when he 
claims that all that is required for rule-following is just that ‘the causal properties of 
such physical events as are interpreted as messages in the internal code must be 
compatible with the linguistic properties that the interpretation assigns to those 
events.’   
 
Indeed, the computer analogy lets the representationalist down at just this point.  I 
asked rhetorically why we would need to build a computer that consults performance 
rules and is guaranteed (barring mechanical failure) to act as they require?  Why not 
merely build it to conform to these rules?  But this is of course what we do.  
Computers do not compute rule-representations if this means that they consult 
performance rules as to how the computations should be effected.  Rather the 
computers’ mechanism is built so that certain sequences of operations are applications 
say, of an inference rule, which, to paraphrase Ryle, is a fact about the efficiency and 
intelligence of the programmer or designer and not the computer.  Nor do computers 
                                         
11 As Wittgenstein objects when his interlocutor suggests that a meaning rule (or ostensive definition) 
could be set up for an (allegedly) private object, ‘What is this ceremony for?  For that is all it seems to 
be!’ (§258).    
 
 21
 manipulate representations if these are to be construed as symbols with content or 
meaning; for the whole point of syntactic operations is that their semantic properties 
are inessential.  
 
When Dennett suggests we ignore what he calls a ‘rather modest bit of 
lexicographical purism’ he is asking us to ignore an illegitimate equivocation on the 
expression ‘representation’ which makes all the ontological difference.  If the symbols 
are performance rule-formulae and function as such, then the use is legitimate.  But 
for them to function as such, not only must they be interpretable as rule-formulae, 
they must be so interpreted and this interpretation must guide the interpreter’s 
performance.   
 
In other words, and to repeat, we may agree to call uninterpreted, but interpretable 
symbols ‘representations’ as he suggests, but if we agree to stretch the meaning of 
‘representation’ in this way, and we extend the computer analogy to the case of 
human agents, it would present the computationalist with a renewed homunculus 
problem.  For if physical events are interpreted as messages in the internal code, 
which are in turn compatible with linguistic properties that ‘the interpretation assigns 
to them’, an interpreter, it would seem, is still required to do the interpreting.  If 
however, the rules that govern computations are only represented in the weak sense 
that the causal processes may but need not be so interpreted, then this is to admit that 
the rule-representation is not necessary and that the uninterpreted causal processes are 
sufficient for explanation.  This collapses the rule-following/rule-conformity 
distinction and threatens the ontological status of the rule-representations alleged to 
govern the computations that operate over them.12 
    
The Intellectualist had required the existence of higher-order practices in order to 
explain the intelligence of the lower-order ones; this presented him with a vicious 
explanatory regress.  The computationalist, in an attempt to avoid the regress, 
collapses these practices into an algorithm in which there is no genuine latitude as to 
                                         
12  Although I cannot discuss this here, a similar argument, it seems, can be run for the first-order 
representations (‘tokens’ of beliefs over which the computations are allegedly performed).  For the 
same vehicle-cargo model (as Ryle calls it) is adopted by any view that conceives mental concepts to 
signal the existence of states or events (the ‘attitudes’) which carry propositions or meaning as content.  
This means that the representationalist as well as the functionalist is threatened.  
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 how the ‘rules’ of the programming language are to be implemented.13  Whereas the 
Intellectualist is guilty of requiring the existence of second-order practices which 
pushes back the explanatory problem; the computationalist is guilty of forgetting that 
the performance rules belong to the second-order practice and if they figure at all, 
they figure for the computer designer.  Dennett admits that sophisticated switching 
machinery is required to get the right command going to the right tools, and that it 
may be helpful to treat parts of this switching machinery as analogous to displaced 
shovellers, subcontractors and contractors.  But the importance of this remark is 
unnoticed.  If it is helpful to treat parts of the switching machinery thus, it is for the 
benefit of the designer.  For if any rule-following occurs here, as opposed to mere 
rule-instantiation, it is the designer who accomplishes it.  She is the one deciding how 
the rule is to be interpreted and implemented; it is she who will have to anticipate new 
applications.  
 
Could it be that because there has been some success in building expert systems in 
limited domains, cognitivist scientists have been over-excited by the possibility that 
we ourselves are organic examples of similar computational systems?   But the fact 
that expert systems can be built is no evidence that we are anything like them.  The 
designer of the system is distilling performance rules and heuristics from some 
practice in which norms or standards that help identify correct or successful moves 
can be discerned.14  In building a machine that instantiates the programme, she is in 
effect making decisions about how the rules are to be followed.  Just like the directors 
of Final Fantasy, computer designers have looked at what people do to build their 
expert systems.  The problem is that the cognitive scientists who are inspired by 
computer design have attempted to throw the community of rule-followers away in 
                                         
13 Even the representationalist is forced to say that mental representations have their content 
intrinsically in order to avoid a homunculus threat.  In functionalism, the crux of the problem comes 
when we see whether it is the mental (semantic) or merely the causal properties that play an 
explanatory role. 
 
14 This is clear to see in PDP architectures, considered by some to be competitors to other 
psychological models as a means of explaining psychological data.  In connectionist systems learning 
rules are used to train networks to give the ‘right’ outputs, given the inputs, by adjusting connection 
weights.  According to Dawson, in order to make the transition from computer design to cognitive 
science, the connectionist must deduce the algorithm that the trained network is ‘using’ and give some 
evidence that this is biologically sound.  But, of course, what counts as the ‘right’ during training is 
decided by the trainer. If PDP architectures are to be models for human cognition, do connectionist 
cognitive scientists suppose, with their classical colleagues, that what counts as ‘right’ for humans is 
determined by the ‘natural’ environment, independently of human practices?   
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 supposing that all of this may be contained within the individual’s brain as a part of 
Nature’s design.  But, as the computer designer should be happy to admit, the 
artificial machines they build are only pixellated ghosts of human practices.   
 
What reason is there to think that the ‘natural’ machines cognitivists imagine us to be 
are not the same?15  
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